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ABSTRACT
In light of recent claims about increasing religious polarization in 
secularized countries, we study the extent to which the non-religious 
contest religion in Western European countries and whether and how 
the Protestant and Catholic heritage of these countries plays a role in 
this. Analyzing data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP 
1998 and 2008) data by means of multilevel analysis, we demonstrate 
that religious polarization is stronger in the most secularized countries 
and in countries with a Catholic religious heritage. Moreover, in 
secular countries, polarization stems from religious fervency, whereas 
in countries with a Catholic heritage, it stems from anti-religious 
fervency.
Introduction
Whether secularization leads to cultural conflict between the religious and the non-
religious in Western Europe has become a deeply contested question (Achterberg et al. 
2009; Bagg and Voas 2010; Bruce 2002; Fox 2016; Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012). 
Eric Kaufmann, Anne Goujon, and Vegard Skirbekk predict the emergence of anti-clerical 
European atheism in the coming decades, in response to a combination of religious decline 
bottoming out and religious growth due to demographic factors — hence the title of their 
article: “The End of Secularization” (Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012). Authors like 
Steve Bruce (Bruce 2002, 41, 2011, 38), David Voas (Voas 2009), and Samuel Bagg and 
Voas (Bagg and Voas 2010) argue against such a dual process of revival of religion and 
anti-religiosity and for a continued, gradual, and generational process of religion losing its 
individual, social, and public adherence and significance. This process of religious decline 
does not so much produce a militant atheist contention of religion, but rather widespread 
attitudes of non-religious indifference toward religion. The question that underlies this 
disagreement—whether secular contexts spark either “anti-clerical atheism” (Kaufmann, 
Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012, 88) or “religious indifference” (Bagg and Voas 2010) among 
the non-religious has, however, not been conclusively answered yet. Building on recent 
contributions by Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme in Sociology of Religion (Wilkins-Laflamme 2014) 
and in this journal (Wilkins-Laflamme 2016) about increases in religious polarization, the 
present article addresses this problem by means of data from the International Social Survey 
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Program Religion II and III modules (ISSP 1998 and 2008). It applies multilevel analysis to 
study whether country-level secularity affects the degree to which the non-religious contest 
religion and whether Protestant or Catholic religious heritages play a similar role.
Theory
Wilkins-Laflamme’s polarization thesis
The principal thesis Wilkins-Laflamme puts forward in her articles on religious polarization 
is that, as a result of religious decline, a remaining core of fervently religious people and 
a growing non-religious majority increasingly come to stand opposite each other. In both 
articles, she relies on statistical analyses of repeated cross-sectional survey data from the 
United States, Great Britain, and Canada (1985–2012), conceiving of religious polarization 
as the combination of a proportional decline of those who are merely nominally religiously 
affiliated on the one hand and a proportional increase (or at least non-decline) of those 
who are either religiously unaffiliated or seriously religiously committed. This polarization 
proves to be most visible in regions and countries with higher shares of Protestant affiliates 
(Alberta/British Columbia, Great Britain) and less so in regions and countries with higher 
shares of Catholic affiliates (e.g. Northern Ireland, Ontario, Quebec) (Wilkins-Laflamme 
2014, 290). Following up on this finding in her subsequent article (Wilkins-Laflamme 2016), 
Wilkins-Laflamme uses the same datasets and geographical locations to demonstrate that, 
although Protestants have lost more ground than Catholics in terms of belief and affiliation, 
the remaining Protestant core is nonetheless more religiously committed in the more rather 
than the less secular contexts.
In fact, Wilkins-Laflamme demonstrates that Catholic resilience regarding secularization 
does not show in stable attendance rates, but in affiliation rates, which she associates with 
strong cultural and identity ties: Catholics tend to hold on to their religious identity, even 
if they are no (longer) religiously active. This is different for Protestants who tend either to 
disaffiliate or to become more fervent in and committed to their religion. Wilkins-Laflamme 
explains this Protestant tendency by referring to Protestantism’s marked individualism, 
which can also be seen in its foregrounding of sincerity and authenticity (Lindholm 2013) 
and accounts for its marked proneness to fragmentation. This individualism leads inactive 
liberal Protestants to disaffiliate, as this choice is understood as more logical, sincere, and 
honest than remaining merely nominally affiliated. The fragmented Protestant landscape 
reinforces this trend, as the absence of strong boundaries between Protestants and non-
Protestants makes it socially quite acceptable to disaffiliate. Basically, the same Protestant 
logic encourages religious fervency among the remaining core of pure believers by the 
foregrounding of individual salvation through personal faith and the marked emphasis 
on born-again experiences in more evangelical Protestant groups rather than the mere 
fact of being born into a religious community (also see McCleary 2007). The outcome is 
greater polarization between fervently religious minorities and non-religious majorities in 
Protestant contexts, whereas, in Catholic contexts, much more of a nominal religious mid-
field remains intact (Wilkins-Laflamme 2016, 168).
This analysis has far-reaching implications for the issue of the religious–secular polarization 
in secular societies. Wilkins-Laflamme after all suggests, but does not actually demonstrate, 
increased contestations of religion among the non-religious. In her “Polarization” article 
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(Wilkins-Laflamme 2014), she refers to secular1 reactions to the Muslim presence in Great 
Britain and other European countries, such as the ban on religious dress in schools and 
public buildings and opposition to the construction of mosques (Wilkins-Laflamme 2014, 
287, with reference to Cesari 2005 and Husbands 1995). Whether or not such intolerance of 
religion merely targets Islamic religious manifestations or pertains to religion more generally 
does not become very clear in Wilkins-Laflamme’s argument (for an extended discussion of 
this point, see Bornschier 2010; Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2015; Van Bohemen 
et al. 2011), but, in her “Distinctions” article, she writes that
Those opposed to religion, such as members of active atheist and humanist movements, hope 
for a religion-free future where scientific reasoning and forms of secular morality trump all. But 
rather than disappearing into obscurity, religion appears to have become even more contentious 
in contemporary Western societies, with debates surrounding issues as home-grown extremism 
and the presence of religious symbols in public settings. (Wilkins-Laflamme 2016, 166)
Indeed, she suggests that the polarization of a “fervent, vocal, and politically active religious 
core with values starkly different from non-religious individuals […] harbors the potential 
for social conflict with secular society and between religious minorities” (Wilkins-Laflamme 
2016, 177).
Yet, Wilkins-Laflamme’s analysis does not provide empirical support for these suggestions. 
Firstly, her analysis is based on polarization regarding levels of religious commitment, not 
on the contestation of religion among the non-religious. She thus focuses on polarization 
at the religious pole, not taking into account what is happening at the secular pole. Indeed, 
Wilkins-Laflamme excludes non-Catholics and non-Protestants from the analysis (Wilkins-
Laflamme 2016, 174), so that religious groups are compared with each other rather than 
with their non-religious environment. Like many others before her, Wilkins-Laflamme treats 
the non-religious group as basically one homogeneous left-over category. Non-believers 
and non-attenders are, for instance, referred to as atheists by Jos Becker and René Vink 
(Becker and Vink 1994) and by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (Norris and Inglehart 
2004, 186), respectively, notwithstanding the fact that the latter term constitutes a contested 
identity (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Smith 2013), so that those thus categorized are 
unlikely to understand themselves in this, or indeed any other, homogeneous and unitary 
way. A number of recent publications have raised awareness that there is a significant 
difference between atheists as non-believers and atheists as religion-haters (Bainbridge 
2005; Bullivant 2008; Guenther 2014; Lee 2012; Ribberink and Houtman 2010; Zuckerman 
2009). In 2012, this journal dedicated a special issue to the diversity in the non-religious 
category (Bullivant and Lee 2012).
A second reason why Wilkins-Laflamme’s analyses do not provide empirical support 
for increased contestations about religion among the non-religious in the most secularized 
countries is that they are confined to the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. 
Although these countries have indeed undergone processes of religious decline, it is clear 
that they do not represent the advanced levels of secularization of the Western European 
countries (Bruce 2011; Voas and Chaves 2016). Studying the latter would moreover allow 
including the path dependencies of Protestant and Catholic religious heritage, to which 
Wilkins-Laflamme refers (see also Inglehart and Baker 2000; Martin 1978, 24). An analysis 
of the contestation of religion among the non-religious in Western Europe thus promises 
to add considerably to the understanding of the religious–secular polarization in secular 
contexts.
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Secularization and anti-religious attitudes
Wilkins-Laflamme’s analysis centers on the process of religion losing its taken-for-
grantedness and cultural legitimacy and becoming a matter of choice and voluntary 
commitment (Wilkins-Laflamme 2014, 287). On the one hand, in contexts of secularity, 
people allegedly no longer understand it as necessary to remain even loosely linked to 
a religious institution. On the other hand, if they do remain religious in those contexts, 
they are allegedly more likely to participate fully and with increased commitment, as this 
constitutes an active and positive choice. This in turn leads to a focus on religious piety and 
purity among the religious, that is, to distancing and detaching oneself from secular society 
(Wilkins-Laflamme 2014, 287).
Whereas Wilkins-Laflamme appears to assume that the non-religious react to these 
increased religious commitments with a similar fervency, she does not actually study 
whether this is the case. Indeed, other relevant literature suggests rather the opposite, 
which is less, instead of more, anti-religious opposition among the non-religious in secular 
contexts. Comparing religious and non-religious parents, for instance, Jonathan Kelley and 
Nan Dirk De Graaf maintain that, in secular countries, non-religious parents constitute the 
majority, which implies they have less to fear from a shrinking religious minority (Kelley 
and De Graaf 1997, 641). Hence, if they worry less, why should they bother or have very 
anti-religious feelings? It is only when the non-religious find themselves in a minority 
position in religious contexts that they might become more fervent and committed (Stahl 
2010, 107), similar to the way the experiences of being a religious minority in secular 
contexts appear to spark religious fervency among the religious (Achterberg et al. 2009, 
698). Further, Kelley and De Graaf argue that, in fact, this might work out differently for the 
non-religious than for the religious (Kelley and De Graaf, 1997, 642). They point out that, 
in religious contexts (let alone in secular contexts), non-religious parents have hardly any 
problem with their children learning about religious beliefs and values at school, as these 
are rarely seen as onerous, and the emotional support and sense of meaning and purpose 
religion provides are seen as valuable (Kelley and De Graaf, 1997, 642). By contrast, religious 
parents aim to insulate their children as much as possible from secular influences in order 
for them to acquire and retain their orthodox beliefs and in order to find devout friends 
and marriage candidates. This provides two reasons why religious indifference, rather 
than militant secular and atheist attitudes, is to be expected among the non-religious in 
secular contexts.
Even though some scholars suggest that religion can also trigger anti-religious responses 
in predominantly secular contexts (Casanova 2004; Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012; 
Putnam and Campbell 2010), there is not much empirical support for this in Western Europe 
(Bruce 2011, 38, 2013, 380; Glendinning and Bruce 2011). Indeed, most recent studies of 
non-religious and atheist contention of religion support the argument that anti-religious 
sentiments are particularly pronounced in the United States and in the relatively religious 
countries of Western Europe (Amarasingam 2010; Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 
2013; Zuckerman 2009). Considering the contemporary situation in Western Europe, we 
thus expect the non-religious to oppose religion most strongly only in contexts where 
religion has a strong hold on society. We expect weakest anti-religious attitudes among the 
non-religious in the most secular countries (Hypothesis 1).
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Protestant and Catholic distinctions in anti-religious attitudes 
In her 2016 article, Wilkins-Laflamme argues that it is worth re-visiting the classic divide 
between Protestantism and Catholicism, in order to understand “more advanced patterns 
of secularization” (Wilkins-Laflamme 2016, 165). Indeed, throughout the literature on 
secularization, references are made to the resistance and opposition Catholicism has faced 
from “rivalrous secular universalisms” (Martin 1978, 76), like the French revolutionaries of 
the eighteenth century and the socialist movements of the twentieth century (see also Bruce 
2011, 31; Campbell 2007, 224; Martin 2000; Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2015). 
Whereas Protestants have historically tended to retreat from strong political involvement, 
as long as their religious freedom was guaranteed (Woodhead 2004), Catholic societies 
have tended to incite a split between the Catholic social order, in which God, Church, and 
State were virtually synonymous, and its secular rivals. Whatever their precise political or 
social ideology (rationalist, Freemason, socialist, etc.), secular and even mildly religious 
movements became basically anti-religious in contexts where Catholicism constituted 
the dominant cultural power and where its cultural and political values became deeply 
embedded in society.2
These values, such as solidarity, respect for authority, and nationalism, foreground the 
importance of the collective realm and create strong and dominant mono-cultures (Martin 
1978, 18–20) that stem from the Catholic notion of the Church as God’s city on earth, as 
the representative through which He reveals himself (Troeltsch 1922; Woodhead 2004). The 
Church provides a sense of unity, community, and belonging, which is closely intertwined 
with family bonds and notions of national identity. Moreover, Danièle Hervieu-Léger argues 
that many issues in Catholic countries (even in ‘secular’ France), which have basically 
nothing to do with religion as such (e.g. the quality of food or demands for workers’ rights), 
are nonetheless imbued with Catholic values (Hervieu-Léger 2006, 51). This cultural aspect 
of Catholicism makes is more difficult for the typical Catholic who is in doubt as to whether 
to disaffiliate from the Church than would be the case for the typical Protestant, which 
also accounts for the higher levels of nominal affiliation among Catholics as indicated 
above (Wilkins-Laflamme 2014). The Catholic hold on national cultures has empowered 
the defense of national identities and values against competing totalitarian powers, for 
instance, in Poland during the Cold War (Martin 1978, 24), and in doing so, it has also 
played a major role in withstanding secularizing forces (at least for the time being, see Bruce 
2002, 31). Apart from political rivalry, and even apart from contemporary moral outrage 
about scandals of sex abuse,3 the reason to oppose religion in Catholic contexts is very 
much informed by the cultural all-pervasiveness and omnipresence of religion. Becoming 
non-religious in such a context entails a marked act of deviance that places one outside 
the community.
This is different in Protestant societies. After the Reformation, Protestants maintained 
a rather demystified and rationalized faith in a transcendent and independent God (Bruce 
2011, 28–29), which opened the way for the exploration of nature with scientific methods 
and for a more privatized spirituality, not focused on establishing God’s Kingdom in the 
here and now, but on seeking moral and spiritual purity in small communities of the ‘elect’. 
The Protestant emphasis on individual salvation, rationality, and purity paved the way for 
pluralism, relativism, doubt, and ultimately disaffiliation (Berger 1967, 111; Bruce 2011, 
47). In Protestant countries, non-religiosity is in effect less of a problem and more common 
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because Protestantism does not dominate the public domain or the national culture in the 
way Catholicism does.
Protestant and Catholic value patterns have been instilled in Western European countries 
since the Reformation period and the political turmoil that followed it (1517–1648) (Daiber 
2002; Gillespie 1999; Gorski 2000; Woodhead 2004). Although there have been major 
political, cultural, and social changes and upheavals (e.g. the Enlightenment, modernization, 
two world wars) and despite significant secularization, the distinct value patterns associated 
with Catholicism and Protestantism continue to be recognizable in Western Europe 
(Hervieu-Léger 2006, 50; Martin 2014, 15). Even in everyday life, values like prudence, 
tactfulness, and conflict avoidance (Catholic) and the need to demonstrate purity of the 
soul and honesty of intentions as well as putting a premium on sincerity, frankness, and 
openness (Protestant), although not religious in and of themselves, have their roots in these 
respective religious heritages (Lindholm 2013, 365; Magill 2012, 27). Likewise, we argue that 
these heritages continue to influence Western European countries, influencing non-religious 
people’s attitudes toward morality and politics (Inglehart and Baker 2000, 49; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004, 20) and attitudes toward religion among the non-religious (Ribberink, 
Achterberg, and Houtman 2013, 116). The non-religious in Protestant countries will see no 
harm in the relatively small-scale, privatized, and individualized religion which stimulates 
moral living without dominating the public domain. By contrast, the non-religious in 
Catholic countries will feel strong aversion against the Catholic mono-culture, with which, 
despite declining levels of belief and attendance, all segments of society are imbued. They 
might have stayed within the church for a long time, perhaps partly to avoid conflict with 
their communities, but when they become openly non-religious, this constitutes an act of 
defiance against a strong cultural dominance. Our second hypothesis thus states that anti-
religious attitudes among the non-religious will be strongest in countries with a Catholic 
rather than a Protestant heritage (Hypothesis 2).
Operationalization
We are interested in the way the level of secularity and the Protestant and Catholic religious 
heritage influence understandings of religion among the non-religious in Western European 
countries. In order to test our hypotheses, we have used two waves of the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP)—the Religion II and Religion III datasets—that contain 
the questions about the religious practices and attitudes that we need for our analysis. We 
wanted to use every ISSP wave that is available for each country, but we could not include 
the first wave (Religion I), as it has no data on two of the four variables that we used to 
construct our dependent variable. We included all Western European countries available 
in the ISSP datasets: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, East and West Germany,4 
Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Northern Ireland, with N=41,146 in 32 countries/waves.
Our dependent variable is anti-religiosity, which is measured by a scale tapping the 
respondents’ attitudes toward the influence religion can have on the public domain. We 
used four questions that straightforwardly ask for respondents’ views on this matter. Two of 
these ask for their attitudes toward religious leaders influencing government decisions and 
people’s vote. The two others address intolerance of religious people and whether religion 
creates conflict or not. We linearly combined the four above-mentioned Likert items, with 
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answer categories ranging between 1 (strongly agree) and 5 (strongly disagree) that together 
yield a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α: .71, see Table 1). We reversed the scale, so that higher 
scores indicate higher levels of anti-religiosity.5
Non-religiosity is measured as non-belief. There are other ways in which non-religiosity 
could be measured, like non-affiliation or non-attendance. We chose non-belief because it 
is the most open and neutral measure, in the sense that it does not say anything about either 
commitment to religious institutions or religious identity. It simply indicates reluctance to 
believe. We shall show below how this is related to attitudes toward religious institutions 
and religious identities. Respondents who answered either “I do not believe in God” or “I 
don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to find out” to the 
question what best describes their belief are coded as ‘non-believers’ (1) and all others as 
‘believers’ (0). To be comprehensive, we control for the effect of non-attendance, with answer 
categories ranging from several times a week (coded 1) to never or not religious (coded 
8). This measure correlates moderately with the non-belief measure (Pearson’s r =0.423, 
p<0.001), but not enough to create multicollinearity in our multilevel model.
Country-level secularity is measured by aggregating the individual scores for non-
attendance for each country per wave. Here, we use the non-attendance measure, which is 
the most commonly used measure for assessing country-level secularity (Bagg and Voas 
2010; Bruce 2013; Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2013; Voas 2009). We include wave 
as a separate variable to control for the time effect.
The Catholic heritage measure is operationalized using the Religious Characteristics 
of States dataset (RCS), which includes all available historical data on religious affiliation 
(Barrett 1982; Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2001; Bennett and Stam 2000; Johnson and Grim 
2013; Mitchell 1998; United Nations 2012).6 This variable shows that, in 1900, almost 100% 
of the Western European population was registered as religiously affiliated and that countries 
were almost completely Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox, with some countries having a 
mixed heritage. An overview of this variable together with the country-level secularity 
measure is given in Table 2 and a visual mapping of countries’ religious heritage according 
to these measures is shown in Figure 1.
In order to validate this measure, that is, to assess whether these historical patterns can 
still be recognized today, we designed a variable based on the aggregated shares of religious 
affiliates of either Catholic/Orthodox7 or Protestant churches, ranging from 0 (100% 
Protestant heritage) to 1 (100% Catholic heritage). An overview of this variable is presented 
in Appendix A. The correlation coefficient between this measure of a country’s share of 
Protestant and Catholics in 2008 and the historical data of 1900 is very high (Pearson’s 
Table 1. factor and reliability analysis for the anti-religiosity scale.
Source: iSSp 1998 and 2008.
Questions Factor Loading
How much do you agree or disagree with: religious leaders should not try to influence how people 
vote in elections. 0.81
religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions. 0.79
looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace. 0.65
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r =0.971, p<0.001). This indicates that, despite the degree to which it has secularized, a 
country’s religious identity has not changed significantly in a hundred years. We did not 
include the ISSP-based measure of shares of religious affiliates in our model, but ran a 
separate multilevel model with this measure, replacing the RCS 1900 measure, which yields 
almost identical results.
As a control variable on the macro-level, apart from the wave variable mentioned earlier, 
we used the country’s GDP per capita (US$) (Inglehart 1997, 221; Inglehart and Baker 
2000, 34), using the UN statistics web site8 for data on this variable. On the individual 
level, we also controlled for gender, level of education, and age (Houtman 2003, 63, 97). We 
standardized all variables used. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables 
that we thus created.
Results and analysis
We used ordinary least squares linear multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood 
estimation to test our hypotheses. We did so for two reasons. First and foremost, multilevel 
analysis makes it possible to estimate simultaneously effects of individual-level variables 
and country-level variables. Our data are structured in such a way that there are two levels: 
41,146 individuals with certain characteristics (e.g. affiliation, attitudes) are nested in 32 
Table 2. Country level secularity and Catholic heritage for 32 Western european country waves.
Source: iSSp 1998 and 2008, rCS.
Country Secularity Proportion Catholics 1900
ireland ‘98 3.17 .74
ireland ‘08 3.78 .74
Cyprus ‘98 3.97 .78
Cyprus ‘08 4.49 .78
northern ireland ‘98 4.45 .32
northern ireland ‘08 4.74 .32
portugal ‘98 4.61 1.00
portugal ‘08 4.89 1.00
italy ‘98 4.67 .96
italy ‘08 4.52 .96
austria ‘98 5.20 .89
austria ‘08 5.60 .89
Spain ‘98 5.34 .97
Spain ‘08 5.78 .97
Switzerland ‘08 6.06 .42
Switzerland ‘98 5.67 .42
germany (West) ‘98 6.06 .36
germany (West) ‘08 5.84 .36
Sweden ‘98 6.14 .00
Sweden ‘08 6.65 .00
netherlands ‘98 6.24 .35
netherlands ‘08 5.76 .35
great Britain ‘98 6.36 .13
great Britain ‘08 6.70 .13
Denmark ‘98 6.46 .00
Denmark ‘08 6.28 .00
france ‘98 6.55 .97
france ‘08 6.64 .97
norway ‘98 6.70 .00
norway ‘08 6.77 .00
germany (east) ‘98 7.34 .36
germany (east) ‘08 7.15 .36
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country waves with certain characteristics (aggregated level of secularity, religious heritage, 
GDP). In such cases, multilevel analysis is the most suitable option. Secondly, as we aim to 
investigate whether and how individuals respond to differences in country-level secularity 
and religious heritage, multilevel analysis is particularly suitable as it allows for testing these 
expected cross-level interactions. We estimated different models with different effects. These 
are effects of variables at either the individual or at the country level and we estimated the 
interactions between these variables. Each of the models also contains so-called random 
effects. These effects, noted as variances, are estimations of the variability of the mean level 
of anti-religiosity in a country and of the variability of anti-religiosity at the individual level. 
Each model that shows lower levels of these types of variability explains anti-religiosity a 
bit better. Table 4 shows the results of our analysis.
Figure 1.  representation of protestant and Catholic heritage and level of secularity of 32 country waves 
in 1998 and 2008 (iSSp).
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of all variables used.
Source: iSSp 1998 and 2008.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Secularity country wave 32 3.17 7.34 5.6869 .98615
proportion Catholics in 1900 country 32 0 1 .5326 .37767
gDp ($) per capita 32 24,789 96,683 53,033.7359 16,875.5861
Wave (1998=0, 2008=1) 42,769 0 1 .5435 .49811
male (1) or female (2) 42,769 1 2 1.5354 .49875
age 42,747 16 98 47.57 17.332
level of education 42,378 .00 5 2.5773 1.46943
anti-religiosity 42,636 1 5 3.9453 .78135
non-belief 42,344 0 1 .2389 .42645
non-attendance 41,996 1 8 5.6914 2.2446
Valid n (listwise) 41,146
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Looking at the outcomes of our analysis, we notice that, apart from country-level 
secularity, none of the country-level variables has a significant effect on respondents’ 
anti-religious attitude.9 This means that anti-religious attitudes are primarily related to 
people’s individual characteristics. This is also visible in the relatively high level of explained 
variance at this level, compared to the country level. To the extent that this attitude is more 
prevalent in some countries than in others, this must therefore be attributed to that country’s 
composition (more people living there with that attitude). The control variable ‘education’ 
has no independent effect on respondents’ opposition to religion. Only males and older 
people appear to oppose religion a bit more than females and younger people, respectively.
Considering the two indicators of non-religiosity, namely non-belief and non-attendance, 
it is noticeable that non-attenders have higher scores on anti-religiosity than non-believers. 
This could be explained by the fact that non-attenders already speak with their behavior—for 
them, not going to church is an expression of not liking the church, whereas among non-
believers there is more diversity. Of these, for example, some might feel a sense of belonging 
without believing (Davie 1994). This would mitigate the score on anti-religious attitudes for 
this group. Nevertheless, compared to believers, non-believers are on average significantly 
more anti-religious in their attitudes, which is, of course, what we would expect to find. The 
strong anti-religiosity among non-attenders also explains the negative effect of country-
level secularity, as these variables are related (the country variable is an aggregation of the 
individual-level variable). Leaving out the individual variable from this model results in a 
positive effect for country-level secularity (.02 n.s.) and increases the non-belief effect (.19***).
Considering the question of the context in which non-believers have the strongest anti-
religious attitudes, we expected less, rather than more, anti-religiosity among the non-
religious in the most secular contexts (Hypothesis 1). In Model 4 of Table 4, the cross-level 
interaction effect between non-belief and country secularity is, however, positive. At first 
sight, this is a refutation of our hypothesis. It shows that the polarization between non-
believers and believers regarding the place of religion is stronger when a country is more 
Table 4.  explaining anti-religiosity (olS multilevel analysis, maximum likelihood, n=41,146 in 32 
country waves).
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed test for significance).
Source: iSSp 1998 and 2008, rCS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.00(0.03) 0.01(0.04) 0.00(0.04) 0.00(0.05)
Wave 1998 (ref. =2008) – −0.03(0.06) −0.03(0.06) −0.03(0.06)
Secularity country wave – −0.09*(0.04) −0.09*(0.04) −0.09*(0.04)
proportion Catholics country 1900 – 0.00(0.05) 0.00(0.05) 0.00(0.05)
gDp ($) per capita country – 0.02(0.04) 0.02(0.04) 0.02(0.04)
non-belief – 0.09***(0.01) 0.08***(0.01) 0.08***(0.01)
non-attendance – 0.31***(0.01) 0.31***(0.01) 0.31***(0.01)
gender male (ref. = female) – 0.02*(0.01) 0.02*(0.01) 0.02*(0.01)
education – 0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.01)
age – 0.02**(0.01) 0.02**(0.01) 0.02**(0.01)
Catholic heritage country* – – –
0.02*(0.01)non-belief
Secularity country* – – –
0.04**(0.01)non-belief
-2loglikelihood 115231.22 110612.60 110542.41 110544.66
Variance individual level 0.96 0.86 0.85 0.85
Variance country level 0.035 0.030 0.031 0.031
Variance non-belief – – 0.0030 0.0016
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secular. Figure 2 gives a representation of this finding.10 In Appendix B, a marginal effects 
plot for this interaction is presented, to show its substantive and statistical significance 
(based on Golder 2003).
However, Figure 2 also demonstrates how, in secular contexts, believers in particular 
show relatively low levels of anti-religiosity. This implies that stronger religious–secular 
polarization in secularized contexts can be mostly attributed to the remaining religious 
fervent core, who, of course, maintain strong pro-religious attitudes. In secular contexts, our 
findings thus point to heightened contention of religion, really because of fewer religious 
people creating more turmoil over religious issues (Casanova 1994, 221; Achterberg et al. 
2009, 698). In effect, this nuance confirms both our hypothesis and Wilkins-Laflamme’s 
polarization thesis. We find the religious and non-religious to lie further apart in their anti-
religiosity, whereas Wilkins-Laflamme observed these groups to lie further apart in their 
religious commitment. However, her suggestion that this increased polarization could lead 
to social conflict with secular society finds no support in our findings as far as the non-
religious are concerned. Not the secular majority, but the religious minorities are the ones 
to whom we can primarily attribute this polarization.
Considering our second hypothesis, we expected to find a stronger religious–secular 
polarization, indicated by higher levels of anti-religiosity among non-believers, in countries 
with a Catholic heritage. Again, in Model 4 of Table 4, we find the cross-level interaction 
effect between non-belief and Catholic heritage on anti-religiosity to be positive, this time 
confirming our hypothesis. Figure 3 is a visual representation of this finding (see also 
Appendix C for a marginal effects plot for this interaction).
This figure indicates that the polarization between believers and non-believers is higher 
in countries with a Catholic heritage, compared with Protestant heritage countries. The 
ascending slope for non-believers indicates that, in countries with a Catholic heritage, the 
polarization between the religious and the non-religious can be attributed to relatively high 
Figure 2.  predicted anti-religiosity for believers and non-believers in countries with low and high levels 
of secularity in 32 country waves in 1998 and 2008 (iSSp).
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levels of anti-religiosity among the non-religious. Since our operationalization measures 
a historical presence of Catholicism and since we included country-level secularity in our 
model, we can interpret this finding as a specific link between a country’s Catholic cultural 
identity and anti-religious opposition. Both this stronger polarization and the fact that it 
can be attributed to non-religious fervency support our hypothesis. In light of Wilkins-
Laflamme’s analysis that these countries have lower levels of religious polarization (Wilkins-
Laflamme 2016, 168), this is quite an interesting finding.
Discussion
In this article, we set out to do a complementary analysis of Wilkins-Laflamme’s polarization 
thesis by evaluating the religious–secular polarization from the side of the non-religious. 
In particular, we analyzed the contention of religion in secularized contexts, as Wilkins-
Laflamme suggested that this was a growing phenomenon. Interestingly enough, we found 
the contestation of religion to be related to religious fervency in secular contexts and to 
non-religious fervency in contexts with a Catholic heritage. The former form of polarization 
is similar to the one Wilkins-Laflamme found. The latter situation is different. Wilkins-
Laflamme concluded that the religious–secular polarization was strongest among the 
Protestants living in secularized countries. As to Catholics in secular countries, they would 
embrace nominal religious commitment as an expression of their cultural and identity 
ties and would not become more committed. Although this might be true for religious 
Catholics, our analysis points to stronger anti-religious attitudes among the non-religious 
in countries with a Catholic religious heritage. This indicates that the same cultural climate 
that encourages nominal affiliation by the religious encourages opposition to religion by 
the non-religious. This corresponds with Colin Campbell’s expectation that anti-religious 
protests are generally cries of moral outrage and ethical rebellion (Campbell 1971, 125), 
directed at the norms and values which have become dominant in a group or community 
(see also Campbell 2007, 224; Lehmann 2013, 658; Martin 1978, 24; McLeod 1997, 214; 
Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2017, 264).
Figure 3.   predicted anti-religiosity for believers and non-believers in countries with a protestant and 
Catholic heritage in 32 country waves in 1998 and 2008 (iSSp).
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As far as the most secular countries are concerned, our findings confirm Wilkins-
Laflamme’s picture of stronger religious commitment and larger polarization in secular 
environments. In the debate on conflicts over the place of religion in Western Europe, 
some scholars have expressed the expectation that these conflicts counter the arguments 
for a continuation of secularization (Achterberg et al. 2009, 696; Casanova 1994, 57, 2004, 
2; Gorski et al. 2012, 21). For some, Western Europe has even arrived at a post-secular 
stage, where religion again takes center stage in public life (Gorski and Altinordu 2008, 76; 
Moberg, Granholm, and Nynäs 2012, 2; see also Beckford 2012; Dillon 2010). However, our 
findings show that the contestation of religion in secularized societies cannot be attributed 
to the non-religious. Anti-religious protests must be seen as a stage in a process of religious 
decline, since the latter challenges and desacralizes religious commitment, which opens up 
the possibility of apostasy (Campbell 2007, 125). This is what we find, with lower levels of 
anti-religiosity among the non-religious in countries where many people have already left 
the church and higher levels of anti-religiosity in the case of the Catholic countries, where 
religious affiliation and cultural ties with the church continue to influence the culture of 
these countries, notwithstanding lower levels of religious commitment. This leads us to 
expect that the trend of religious decline will not be reversed in the near future. Therefore, 
reference to the incidence of religious–secular polarization as signaling some kind of post-
secular stage is untimely in our view (see also Bruce 2013). Admittedly, due to lack of 
data, our multilevel analysis did not allow for an analysis of whether and how religious 
decline affects anti-religiosity among the non-religious. Clearly, this is a vital issue that needs 
to be addressed by future research that can rely on longitudinal data (see Te Grotenhuis 
et al. 2015).
When the distinctive religious heritage of Catholicism and Protestantism continues to 
influence secular Western Europeans, as we have found, this is also relevant for the study 
of secular cultural values, attitudes, and practice. As David Martin maintains: “The post-
Protestant North still preens itself on its capacity to internalize rules and laws, rather than 
to accept them in principle while venally evading them in practice” (Martin 2005, 77). 
Our findings have implications for other fields of study, for example, European politics 
(Lehmann 2013, 658). An illustration is a recent newspaper article on the Euro crisis, which 
refers to religious heritage, the divide between a “Calvinist Northern Europe that doesn’t 
want to forgive sinners, and a Catholic Europe that wants to turn the page” (Financial 
Times, 17 July 2015). This is a quote from the French Minister of the Economy Emmanuel 
Macron, talking about the clash between the Greek government and the European Union, 
dominated by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, on the conditions for Greece to stay 
within the European Union. Religious heritage thus emerges as an interesting explanatory 
variable, not only in studies of religion and religious conflict, but also in the field of culture, 
economics, and politics.
Notes
1.  Wilkins-Laflamme calls these responses ‘secular’, where others would perhaps use the term 
‘secularist’, as they are mostly political in nature, coming from governments who want to 
enforce a strict separation of church and state (see Casanova 2004, 2012).
2.  David Martin convincingly argues that the cultural heritage of the Orthodox Church that can 
be found in countries like Cyprus, but also in Greece, is very similar to the Catholic heritage 
and thus speaks of a Catholic/Orthodox monopoly (Martin 2005, 86–87; see also Bruce 2011, 
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8). In terms of its value pattern, it shares with Catholicism, and differs from Protestantism in, 
its tendency to monopolize the religious domain of a national culture and to compete with 
secular authorities for power.
3.  See Nan Dirk De Graaf (2013) and Diego Gambetta (1994) for the way this would influence 
the reputation of religious institutions and ensuing differences in support.
4.  These are separate countries in this dataset.
5.  In order to limit the number of missing values, we recoded “don’t know” to the middle (3: 
neither agree nor disagree), which gives 1.6% missing values instead of 9.3%.
6.  When data were not available, the dataset editors calculated data based on an extrapolation 
from the available sources, so that comparisons are possible. See the codebook and explanations 
on method, design, and sources, accessed 9 March 2018. http://thearda.com/Archive/Files/
Descriptions/BRWNREG2.asp
7.  Cyprus is the only Orthodox country in this selection of Western European countries. (See 
note 2 and Martin 2005, 86–87; see also Bruce 2011, 8.)
8.  Accessed 8 December 2015. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnlList.asp
9.  Manfred Te Grotenhuis et al. (2015) note that comparing countries at one particular moment 
in time does not necessarily produce the same results as comparing historical contexts within 
countries. We are aware of this risk, but we could not follow up on their suggestion to include 
as many waves as possible, for two reasons. Firstly, the ISSP only consists of three waves on 
Religion (1991, 1998, 2008). Even if we had included the third wave, this would not have 
allowed for testing the within-country cross-level interaction, which Te Grotenhuis et al. 
point out as relevant. Secondly, even if three waves were sufficient and if we had included the 
nine Western European countries of the 1991 wave, we would have had to settle for a limited 
and insufficient measurement of anti-religiosity for that year, because the questions about 
religious conflict and religious people’s intolerance were not asked in 1991. This would have 
left us with only the two items about political influence for that year.
10.  This figure is an illustration of the interaction effect only. Because interaction effects cannot 
be interpreted in isolation of the other effects, they need to be interpreted carefully. Our 
illustrations satisfy the criteria developed by Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, and 
Matt Golder (2006).
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Appendices
Appendix A. percentage of religious affiliates per country in 1800, 1900, 1998, and 2008.
Country Religious affiliation RCS 1800 RCS 1900 ISSP 1998 ISSP 2008
Share Prot./Cath. 
religious 2008
austriaa Catholic 89 89 81 73 .92
protestant 2 3 7 6 .08
Cyprusb orthodox 59 77 100 100 1.00
Catholic 1 1 0 0 .00
protestant 0 0 0 0 .00
Denmark Catholic 2 0 0 1 .01
protestant 98 99 87 83 .99
france Catholic 95 97 50 52 .98
protestant 4 3 2 1 .02
germanyc Catholic 37 36 21 29 .40
protestant 61 63 36 33 .60
irelandd Catholic 82 74 90 88 .96
protestant 18 25 5 4 .06
italy Catholic 99 96 90 89 .99
protestant 0 0 1 0 .01
netherlands Catholic 38 35 19 28 .51
protestant 60 60 17 26 .49
norway Catholic 0 0 0 1 .01
protestant 100 99 89 82 .99
portugal Catholic 100 100 90 89 .97
protestant 0 0 2 3 .03
Spain Catholic 100 97 85 76 .99
protestant 0 0 0 1 .01
Sweden Catholic 0 0 1 2 .03
protestant 99 99 69 67 .97
Switzerlande Catholic 41 42 48 35 .56
protestant 59 58 39 35 .44
united Kingdom Catholic 2 13 9 9 .17
protestant 61 65 43 41 .83
unknown 36 19 0 0 .00
northern irelandf Catholic 32 39 36 .41
protestant 67 51 50 .59
aData of 1800 are in fact of 1857.
bData of 1800 and 1900 include northern Cyprus, which has a large share of muslims in its population. iSSp data exclude 
northern Cyprus.
ciSSp data of east and West germany taken together
dData of 1800 are in fact of 1801 and include northern ireland.
eData of 1800 are in fact of 1816. this also applies to germany for 1800.
fData of 1900 are based on calculation extracting northern ireland census data of 1921 from 1920 census total of ireland.
Source: rCS, iSSp 1998 and 2008.
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